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THE TRIAD THAT BINDS: 
HOW COMMON FINANCIAL ANALYST COVERAGE REVEALS DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS OF 
CORPORATE LEADERS TO MAINTAIN BOARD INTERLOCKS 
 
A substantial body of research has examined board of director interlocks, where a top executive affiliated 
with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization as an outside director (Mizruchi, 1996). 
As a unique formal mechanism linking individual top managers of large corporations, board interlock has been 
suggested as a particularly fruitful research arena to examine the social embeddedness perspective that economic 
action is influenced by social structure (Davis & Greve, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Palmer et al., 
1986). Despite this research attention, prior research on board interlock has focused on the relational embeddedness 
of interlocks at the dyad level, paying less attention to structural embeddedness, i.e., how the board interlock itself is 
linked with other external ties of the focal firm CEO and the outside directors. For instance, although corporate 
leaders’ interaction with financial analysts and the influence of financial analysts on corporate strategies have been 
widely documented in the literature (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Useem, 1999; Zuckerman, 2000), fewer studies have 
attempted to investigate i) structural embeddedness of board interlocks in the financial analysts’ firm coverage ties 
(e.g. how the individual executive-analyst ties overlap between the focal CEO and the interlocked directors) and ii) 
whether and how such structural embeddedness influences the maintenance of these two important networks.  
 
In this study, I examine how the maintenance of board interlock ties can be influenced by the positivity or 
negativity of financial analysts’ stock recommendations regarding a focal firm CEO and the outside directors 
representing the interlocked company. Drawing on the theories of triangular ties in structural sociology and social 
psychology (Coleman, 1988; Heider, 1958; Simmel, 1950), I conceptualize the relationship between financial 
analysts, a focal firm CEO, and the outside director as a triad. Two distinct types of triads emerge. In an open triad, 
the focal firm CEO and the outside director (hereafter ‘the interlock dyad’) are followed by different, non-
overlapping sets of financial analysts. In a closed triad, the interlock dyad is followed by the same, overlapping sets 
of financial analysts. One of the most important insights suggested in this literature is that the structural 
transformation from the open to the closed triad (i.e. the presence of a common third-party other) can alter 
individual preferences for dyadic affiliation from finding better tie partners to finding similar partners through 
enhanced social comparison (Festinger, 1954), and cognitive dissonance (Heider, 1958). Indeed, the theoretical 
argument advanced in this study and the supportive empirical findings suggest that when the interlock dyad is 
embedded in an open triad, negative analyst stock recommendations regarding either the focal firm CEO or the 
outside director lead to a higher likelihood of interlock breakage. In a closed triad, however, it is the dissimilarity of 
analyst stock recommendations of the interlock dyad that predicts a higher likelihood of interlock breakage. 
Negative stock recommendations regarding the focal firm CEO in a closed triad are found to decrease the likelihood 
of interlock breakage when the outside director of the interlocked company also receives similarly negative 
recommendations. Furthermore, this structural effect of common financial analyst coverage on interlock 
maintenance is also verified by strong empirical support for two moderating effects –i) structural dependence of the 
interlock dyad on financial analyst firm coverage and ii) demographic similarity of the interlock dyad. Overall, these 
findings provide insights into how the different types of structural closure of financial analyst coverage of the 
interlock dyad can affect the maintenance of their board interlock ties by influencing different dyadic affiliation 
motives of corporate leaders. In the following sections, I provide a brief background on the study before 
summarizing the theoretical framework and hypotheses.  
 
FINANCIAL ANALYST STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS AND BOARD INTERLOCKS 
 
Financial analysts guide investor behavior by interpreting information and providing summary statements 
about corporate finance, strategic decisions, and industry trends of the firms they follow (Hayward & Boeker, 1998; 
Rao et al., 2001; Zuckerman, 2000). Summary statements highlighting future prospects of the covered firm include 
recommendations about whether to buy, hold, or sell the firm’s stock. Apart from the impact on a firm’s market 
valuation and its capacity to raise capital, changes in analyst stock coverages and recommendations are shown to 
ultimately influence a firm’s corporate strategy as well as career prospects of the firm’s top executives (Puffer & 
Weintrop, 1991; Zuckerman, 2000). For instance, Puffer et al. (1991) show that, after accounting for other 
conventional measures of firm performance, a CEO has a greater likelihood of dismissal when reported earnings fall 
short of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Given this wide-ranging impact of financial analysts, it is not surprising that the 
relationships between analysts and corporate leaders are characterized not only by objective evaluation of firm value 
but more importantly by sociopolitical influence. Indeed, CEOs have been shown to i) engage in negative social  
reciprocity toward analysts who issue negative stock recommendations for their firms (Westphal & Clement, 2008), 
ii) respond to analyst questions during corporate conference calls in a discriminatory manner to prefer analysts 
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offering more positive stock ratings of their firms (Mayew, 2008), and even iii) invite as outside directors former 
analysts who had previously given positive evaluations of their companies (Cohen et al., 2008). These incidents 
reveal how much attention corporate leaders pay to the analysts who follow their firms and the significance of 
analyst stock recommendations in executive-analyst relationships. Building on this stream of research, I examine 
how the ties between analysts and executives can function as third-party indirect ties for a focal firm CEO and the 
outside director representing an interlocked company. I also consider how tie content (i.e., the positivity or 
negativity of stock recommendations issued by the analyst) can influence different motivations of a focal firm CEO 
and the outside director to maintain their board interlock ties, depending on different triad closure structures between 
the interlock dyad and the financial analysts’ firm coverage ties.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Open triad and the instrumental motivation to avoid interlock partners with negative stock recommendations 
 
In an open triad where a focal firm CEO and the outside director representing the interlocked company are 
followed by different, non-overlapping sets of financial analysts, the interlock dyad members will interpret the 
overall positivity or negativity of each other’s stock recommendation as their interlock partner’s quality signal 
received from the investor community. The open vs. closed triad is better conceptualized in terms of the concept 
‘structural equivalence’ (Lorrain & White, 1971). Two social actors are structurally equivalent when they interact 
with the same set of alters. Research has shown that structurally equivalent actors function as social referents, 
providing a basis for social comparison, mutual monitoring, and competition (Burt, 1987). Thus, when a focal firm 
CEO and the interlocked director are followed by the same set of financial analysts, i.e. in a closed triad, the two 
executives become structurally equivalent and serve as obvious social comparison peers to each other in 
understanding the relative positivity of their own stock recommendations. In an open triad, however, the motivation 
to understand the interlock partner as basis of social comparison for the focal actor might be less salient.  
 
Thus, the decision to maintain an interlock dyad in an open triad is more likely to be influenced by the 
dynamics of the instrumental social affiliation to prefer a better performing alter over worse performing counterparts 
in terms of stock recommendations as quality signal. While prior studies on board interlocks provide less definitive 
insights into the relationship between firm performance and board interlocks (Davis, 1993; 2004), multiple studies 
on board composition have suggested that corporate executives seek interlock partners that provide positive signals 
to the investor community (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999) and avoid partners that provide negative 
signals (Kang, 2008). This is the classical social influence tactic of basking in the reflected glory of accomplished 
others and distancing oneself from less attractive counterparts. In effect, individuals use social affiliation as an 
instrument to take advantage of the evaluative generalization occurring in the minds of a third party evaluator  
(Cialdini et al., 1999; Podolny, 2005). Therefore, when the interlocked company receives negative stock 
recommendations, the outside director representing the interlocked company may be less likely to be retained on the 
focal company board. Similarly, when the focal company receives negative stock recommendations, the focal 
company CEO will be less likely to be retained on the interlocked company’s board. This line of reasoning leads to 
the following hypothesis. 
 
H1:  Negative financial analyst stock recommendations regarding either the focal company or the interlocked 
company are more likely to lead to the breakage of board interlock ties than when both the companies receive 
positive recommendations. 
 
Closure of the triad and intensification of the cognitive motivation to maintain interlock partners with similar stock 
recommendations 
 
This section builds on the distinction between open and closed triads to consider how closure between the 
interlock dyad and financial analysts fundamentally shifts the dyadic affiliation motive from an instrumental motive 
to a cognitive one, which in turn alters the executives’ decision to maintain different types of board interlock 
partners. Theories of social comparison and triangular balance suggest that a focal CEO or the interlocked director 
will maintain interlock partners with similar stock recommendations and avoid tie partners with dissimilar stock 
recommendations.  
Closure of a triad The formation and maintenance of dyadic ties embedded in a triangular relationship has 
been extensively studied in social psychology, structural sociology, and management (Heider, 1958; for a review 
Kilduff & Krackhardt, 2008; Simmel, 1950). Emphasizing the significance of the transition from dyadic to triadic 
social structure, Simmel (1950:136) wrote that the transition can be characterized by “intensification of (dyadic) 
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relations by a third element, or by a social framework that transcends both members of the dyad”. In the present 
study, a closed triad emerges when a focal firm CEO and the outside director representing the interlocked company 
are followed by a common set of financial analysts. One of the most important features of such a structural 
transformation from an open to closed triad is that the emergence of a third-party other can alter individual 
preferences for dyadic affiliation through enhanced social comparison between dyad members (Burt, 2009). Thus, a 
focal firm CEO or outside director with better analyst stock recommendations in a closed triad will serve as source 
of relative deprivation for the ‘outperformed’ executive (Festinger, 1954; Stouffer et al., 1949), rather than source of 
positive status spillover. Thus, upon receiving negative stock recommendations, the CEO may prefer outside 
directors with similarly negative stock recommendations to their counterparts with positive stock recommendations 
who will make the focal CEO look worse by comparison. Indeed, several studies in top management team literature 
suggest that social comparisons can prevail among corporate executives especially when performance evaluation is 
highlighted (O'Reilly et al., 1988; Porac et al., 1999). Moreover, the focal firm CEO and the outside director of the 
interlocked company would function as direct anchoring points for each other in the common financial analysts’ 
firm evaluation process (Kahneman et al., 1982). When such social comparison by a common third-party evaluator 
is salient, people anticipate the pain of falling behind their social comparison referent and try to avoid such a 
comparison situation. This demonstrates that in closed triads, the relative similarity or dissimilarity of stock 
recommendations forms the basis of social comparison influencing the interlock partner’s decision to maintain the 
tie.   
 
Balance of the triad Theories of interpersonal affiliations in social psychology also explore the “structural-
dynamic character of human cognition” in social life (Simon & Holyoak, 2002), highlighting relational components 
such as liking between dyad members (sentiment) influenced by a third-party. The main proposition of the early 
balance theorists is that individual efforts to maintain cognitive consistency in social affiliations lead to change in 
belief, attitude, and behavior (Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1953). For instance, if a focal person P likes some object O 
(positive relationship), P also likes the alter X (positive sentiment), and P perceives X’s dislike of the object O 
(negative relationship), the triangular relationship P-O-X is ‘unbalanced’, which creates cognitive dissonance 
(members feel ‘uncomfortable’) because the focal person P’s cognitive consistency towards the alter X and the 
object O is violated. Balance theory further predicts that “if no balanced state exists, then forces towards this state 
will arise (Heider, 1946:107-109). As a result, P may feel obliged to dislike O or try to influence O to like X. 
Eventually, the dyadic relationship between P and O could become more fragile. The transitivity of relationship 
content in a triangular relationship is also illustrated by the famous Arab proverb, “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend or the enemy of my friend is my enemy”. Indeed, the proverb indicates that the presence of two negative 
relationships toward the common third-party other enhances the strength of a dyad embedded in a triad. Conversely, 
conflicting relationships (e.g. combination of positive and negative relationships) toward the common third-party 
other will tend to divide the embedded dyad.  
 
From this balance theoretic perspective, dissimilar stock recommendations regarding one of the focal and 
the interlocked companies from the same financial analyst may indicate either i) the absence of positive stock 
recommendations to one of the dyad members (cognitive unit as a third-party object) or ii) the negativity of the 
interpersonal relationship between the analyst and the interlock dyad member who received negative 
recommendation (cognitive unit as a third-party person). In either case, balance theory predicts that imbalance in 
stock recommendations between the focal CEO and the outside director can trigger cognitive dissonance in their 
relations, which in turn makes the board interlock less likely to persist. For instance, contrasting stock 
recommendations from the common financial analyst may yield less positive affect and relational tension between 
the focal CEO and the outside director and make it more difficult to establish a cooperative relationship in the 
boardroom. On the other hand, similar stock recommendations may enhance interpersonal affect and induce 
attitudinal congruence towards the common financial analyst. Indeed, the case of ‘negative balance’ where both the 
focal CEO and the interlocked director receive similarly negative stock recommendations, may enhance 
interpersonal affect between the executives and even induce them to establish a ‘common front’ against the financial 
analyst who holds a negative opinion of their firm performance and strategic capabilities. Thus, the theories of social 
comparison and triangular balance suggest that, in a closed triad where the common financial analyst follows both a 
focal firm CEO and the interlocked director, it is not the positivity but the similarity of stock recommendations of 
the interlock partners that maintains the board interlock ties. Therefore,  
 
H2: The coverage of the focal and the interlocked companies by the same financial analyst a) increases the 
likelihood of board interlock breakage when both the companies receive unbalanced (dissimilar) stock 
recommendations, and b) decrease the likelihood of board interlock breakage when both the companies receive 
balanced (similar) stock recommendations.  
THE TRIAD THAT BINDS   4 
 
Structural and social psychological moderators of the triad closure effect on interlock tie maintenance 
 
The effect of the triad closure can be also moderated by the strength and content of the other ties of the 
triad. For instance, although different stock recommendations regarding a focal CEO and the interlock director cause 
cognitive dissonance in the interlock dyad, the CEO and the director may pay less attention to the analyst stock 
ratings because the analyst has insufficient influence on them. Similarly, the dyadic tie content and strength between 
the focal firm CEO and the outside director representing the interlocked company may mitigate or exacerbate the 
impact of cognitive dissonance on board interlock maintenance under the triad closure. The following section 
examines i) structural dependence of the interlock dyad on financial analyst coverage and ii) demographic similarity 
between the focal CEO and the interlock director as two such potential moderators. 
 
Structural dependence of the interlock dyad on financial analyst coverage Building on Heider’s 
triangular balance, Newcomb (1959) suggested that the greater the strength of the relationship among elements of a 
triad, the greater the triad’s imbalance-induced tension. In other words, the relevance of the third-party X on the P-O 
dyad is contingent on the intensity of P or O’s attitude toward X. For instance, when the stock recommendation from 
the analyst is not highly valued by the focal interlock member, its influence on cognitive dissonance and the dyadic 
tie maintenance is limited.  The  dependence and power relationship among network partners have been explored by 
social exchange theorists (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Emerson, 1962), who conceptualized social relations as ties of 
mutual dependence among the interaction parties. One major prediction of this literature is that the mutual 
dependence is determined by the availability of alternative sources of the alter in achieving a focal actor’s goal 
(Emerson,1962). In the present analysis of the triad, the dependence of a focal firm CEO and the director on the 
common financial analysts and their stock recommendations will be determined by the number of other financial 
analysts following the focal and the interlocked companies. Indeed, when the common financial analyst is one of the 
few analysts following the focal and the interlocked companies, the stock coverage and recommendations from the 
common financial analyst cannot be ignored. Structural dependence of the interlock dyad on the financial analyst 
coverage in turn will amplify the structural effect of the triad on the interlock tie maintenance. Conversely, when the 
common financial analyst is one of the many analysts following the focal and the interlocked companies, the 
dependence of the focal CEO and the interlock director on the common analyst’s coverage is relatively low, thus 
mitigating the triad closure effect for dissimilar stock recommendations. Therefore 
 
H3: Structural dependence of the focal and the interlocked companies on the common financial analysts increases 
the influence of triadic closure on the likelihood of tie breakage.  
 
Demographic similarity of the interlock dyad Another tie characteristics which can moderate the triad 
closure effect on interlock maintenance is the demographic similarity between the focal CEO and the interlock 
director. Demographic similarity in the top management team literature has been operationalized along different 
social-categories (e.g. age, race, and gender) or professional backgrounds (e.g. education, functional background and 
industry tenure). Studies highlighted that demographic similarity among board members tends to increase 
interpersonal trust and open communications and contribute to better group decision making (Smith et al., 1994; 
Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Studies in social psychology and sociology also suggested the similarity-attraction 
process as almost an automatic cognitive process triggering interpersonal attraction and liking (Berscheid & Walster, 
1969; Byrne, 1971), which in turn leads to more homophilious social affiliation (Ibarra, 1996; McPherson et al., 
2001; Newcomb, 1961). In the current study, interpersonal attraction and trust based on the demographic similarity 
of the interlock dyad may mitigate the cognitive dissonance caused by dissimilar stock recommendations from the 
common analyst and decrease the structural effect of triad closure on interlock maintenance. In other words, 
demographically similar CEOs and directors are less likely to decide to break the interlock tie as a reaction to the 
dissimilar stock recommendations from the same analyst than their demographically dissimilar counterparts. 
Moreover, social psychology studies on self-protective biases in social categorization consistently indicate that in-
group vs. out-group bias in social categorization becomes more pronounced especially when the focal actor 
experiences a threat (Miller et al., 2010). Dissimilar stock recommendations from the common financial analyst may 
be perceived as a kind of performance threat by the ‘outperformed’ executive of the interlock dyad, who would 
prefer to interact with demographically similar interlock partner over the demographically dissimilar counterpart. 
This then leads to the final hypothesis. 
 
H4: Demographic similarity between a focal firm CEO and the interlocked director decreases the likelihood of 
interlock breakage under unbalanced stock recommendations from the same financial analyst recommendations. 
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SUMMARY OF METHOD AND RESULTS 
  
I used a longitudinal panel research design to examine the maintenance of board interlock as a function of 
negativity or imbalance of financial analyst stock recommendations for the focal and the interlocked company. The 
sample was derived from the S&P 500 companies representing large industrial and service corporations listed on 
U.S. stock exchanges. 471 companies were retained for the sample periods of 2001 and 2008. Board interlocks are 
constructed based on the director list obtained from the BoardEx database. I followed all the financial analysts and 
their stock recommendations for the focal and the interlocked companies from the start of the board interlocks until 
the ties were broken. Analysts’ firm coverage and stock recommendation data were obtained from IBES. This 
yielded 17,745 observations of focal-interlocked company dyads and 1,819 final triads over the sample period. 
Board interlock breakage was coded as a dichotomous variable when the interlocked director was not reelected at 
annual shareholder’s meeting. Following prior research on the positivity or negativity of analyst appraisals, I 
categorized “strong buy” and “buy” as positive categories and all the other ratings including “hold” negative. 
Negativity or imbalance of recommendations is coded as a dichotomous variable indicating the respective category 
of stock recommendations calculated as the median value of all the stock recommendations during the most prior 
year (twelve preceding months) to the annual shareholder meeting date (Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Structural 
dependence on analyst coverage was coded as the inverse of the total number of analyst following the focal and the 
interlocked companies. Demographic similarity was measured in terms of the director age, gender, elite education, 
and functional background (Hambrick et al., 1996; Westphal & Milton, 2000). Conventional accounting and market 
measures of firm performance, individual director variables, firm characteristics, and alternative 
interpersonal/interorganizational ties were controlled. Random-effects logistic panel regression model was used with 
clustered standard errors around the focal CEO-interlocked director dyads to address the lack of independence 
among the dyads. All independent and control variables were lagged by one year. I followed the usual cautionary 
measures in analyzing the marginal and interaction effect of logistic regression models (Hoetker, 2007).  
 
The results strongly supported the theoretical perspectives of the study. Consistent with H1, the negativity 
of financial analyst stock recommendations regarding the focal and/or the interlocked company is positively 
associated with the likelihood of board interlock breakage in an open triad (a 121% increase in the likelihood of 
board interlock breakage when other variables are fixed at their mean). Consistent with H2, an imbalance of stock 
recommendations is positively associated with the likelihood of interlock tie breakage when the triad is closed (a 
210% increase in the likelihood of board interlock breakage when other variables are fixed at their mean). Such 
interaction effect with the triad closure is not found for the negativity of stock recommendations. Moreover, the 
likelihood of interlock breakage is found to decrease by as much as 52% when both the focal and the interlocked 
companies receive negative stock recommendations by the same financial analyst. Furthermore, the median-split 
subsample analysis with Heckman selection procedure also provided strong support for H3. The effect of triad 
closure on tie breakage becomes non-significant for the subsample of low analyst coverage dependence. The 
subsample analysis also confirmed the moderating effect of demographic similarity between the focal CEO and the 
interlocked director (H4). Consistent with the study’s theoretical perspectives, more surface-level similarity such as 
age and gender was found to negatively moderate the structural effect of dissimilar stock recommendations under 
the triad closure. 
 
The present study contributes to the study of board interlocks and the larger literature of interorganizational 
networks by considering the financial analysts’ firm coverage ties as a neighbor network of the board interlocks. 
Although there exist studies on the role of third-party alter’s indirect ties on the formation and maintenance of 
dyadic ties, these studies focused on the role of indirect ties as information conduits (Burt & Knez, 1995; Gulati & 
Westphal, 1999), paying less attention to how the combination of triangular structure and the indirect tie content (e.g. 
positivity or balance) can influence different motivations of tie maintenance for the dyad members. By 
conceptualizing the relationship between financial analysts, a focal firm CEO, and the outside director as a triad and 
considering the indirect tie content of the triad, this study reveals that a structural shift from open to closed triad can 
alter dyad members’ tie maintenance motivations from instrumental to cognitive motives, which in turn results in 
interlock tie breakages that cannot be foreseen with the assumption of instrumental motivations only. This study also 
has implications for the vibrant literature in strategy and organizational studies on the influence of external firm 
constituents such as financial analysts on corporate governance. Future studies can extend this study’s 
conceptualization of triadic structure between board interlock and external ties of the board interlock members to 
different sets of external constituents such as journalists or institutional investors.■ 
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